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Religion in Our Public Schools: Has the Supreme
Court's Treatment of Religion Made Government
Intervention in Education Unconstitutional?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Supreme Court adjudication in the area of religion in public
education has been inconsistent at best and a display of flagrant
preference at worst. If the United States Supreme Court's First
Amendment analysis of religion in the public schools is pushed to
its logical conclusion, the curricula of public schools may well be
outside the realm of government control altogether. In support of
this thesis, this article examines the various definitions of
"religion" and "secular," surveys U.S. Supreme Court cases
showing the treatment and definition of religion, and shows that
the "state" has violated the Establishment Clause by establishing
religion in our public schools. In conclusion, this article contends
that Constitutionally-bound government should no longer be
actively engaged in educational curriculum decisions, and suggests
some possible alternatives to current government control of
education that can be implemented to allow an appropriate level
of religious influence while upholding the Constitution and keeping
education "free" and "public."

II.

DEFINITION OF RELIGION

There are various definitions of religion which have been or
could be used by the Supreme Court. In order to better
understand First Amendment jurisprudence, it is important to lay
out the Court's various, explicit and implicit, definitions of religion.
Religion, in its narrowest sense, has been defined as an established
sect. In a broader application, it is defined as any individually held
world view.
The narrowest definition of religion is belief in a
transcendent being, a God: "an individual's vertical relationship to
a higher order of being, ... to anything that may serve as an a
priori source of human knowledge or foundation for the
explanation of human experience." 1 Thus stated, religion is a

1. Paul J. Toscano, INVISIBLE RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SECULARISM,
NEUTRALITY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 31-40 (Horizon Publishers 1990).
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personal belief in a higher source and revelation from that source.
A broader definition of religion is "religion as the
immanent."2 This suggests the possibility of individual and
community communion with the Transcendent.

A. Religion as Philosophy
An even broader definition is religion as philosophy. 3 This
allows for more than a vertical orientation (man looking to God)
and looks to "the horizontal plane [man looking to man or the
world] and that [which] touch[es] matters humanitarian and social:
the ultimate practical and philosophical concerns about life, death,
good, and evil."4 Philosophy addresses many of the same questions
oflife, death, good, and evil that religion addresses. Often, people
form their world views according to both philosophy and religion.
[W]hen "religion" is expanded to include our fundamental
concerns with our fellow beings and with our natural
environment, then the distinction between philosophy and
religion becomes too blurred to track. The concerns of each
become so intertwined and interconnected that they cannot be
disentangled. What is religion to one person is philosophy to
another. Thus, no definition of religion can be devised that will
not, depending upon one's point of view, potentially embrace
some or all philosophical concerns. 5

Both religion and traditional philosophy ask the
quintessential questions: What is the good, what is the true, and
what is the beautiful? The answers to such fundamental questions
necessarily make value assumptions and judgments about life.

B. Religion as a World View
Religion as a world view broadens the definition beyond
that of mere philosophy. A world view is a pattern or paradigm by
which an individual creates "a scheme for understanding and
explaining certain aspects ofreality."6 The definition of world view
as religion can be expanded further to connote "any system of
beliefs or assumptions [utilized] to see connections and

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ld. at 32.
Id. at 32-34.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 34.

98

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[1996

relationships." 7
Connections and relationships can be based on mythical,
mystical or traditional religious beliefs by looking to the
transcendent; based on science, reason, or the scientific method by
looking to mankind8; or, based on the world or the environment by
looking to nature. 9 The basis for connections and relationships
indicates one's standard of measuring things and one's world view.
The definition of religion as a world view is that an
individual, through personal perception, interprets any value or
any aspect of life. That interpretation is religious belief.

III.

DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION EMPLOYED BY THE SUPREME COURT

Evidence suggests that the definition of religion employed
by the Supreme Court has changed over time. What was intended
by the Framers as the meaning of"religion" is markedly different
than the Court's modern conception.
Originally, "the Bill of Rights contained unprecedented
provisions guaranteeing freedom of religious conscience and
prohibiting the establishment of a national church." 10 It seems
clear from the historical evidence, that in the First Amendment,
"an establishment of religion" meant the public and institutional
manifestation of religion, while "free exercise" referred to private
religion or the private right of conscience. 11 Despite the Framers
intended interpretation, the Court has strayed from those original
narrow definitions, to various, looser, and perhaps even conflicting
definitions.
In the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the First
Amendment, there is a "conspicuous absence ... of any consistent,
complete, and formal definition of the term 'religion."' 12 "The
United States Supreme Court's Religion Clause opinions are widely
perceived to be hostile to religion." 13 In fact, the "judiciary's

7. Id. at 35.
8. For an example of relationships based on looking at mankind, see John
Dewey's A COMMON FAITH.
9. Examples of connections and relationships based on the world, the
environment, or nature can be seen in EMILE by Rousseau and NATURAL RELIGION by
Hume.
10. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religions, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20
Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 120 (1991).
11. Toscano, supra note 1, at 64.
12. Id. at 63.
13. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev.
671 (April 1992). See also Richard A. Baer, Perspectives on Religion and Education
in American Law and Politics: The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term
"Sectarian", 6 J.L. & Pol. 449 (Spring 1990).
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church-state principles do not resonate with the popular
sentiments. They seem counterintuitive to the average citizen and
the Court knows it." 14
IV. SECULARISM AS AN IDEOLOGY FALLS INTO THE DEFINITION OF
RELIGION

Secularism has been defined in terms of placement of
political power. During the Medieval period, the spheres of
"religious" and "secular" did not exist as descriptions of
fundamentally different aspects of society. . . . There were two
forces that encouraged the institutional separation of church and
state into fundamentally different social spheres of the religious
and the secular; one force was theological, the other political ...
[T]he state was not understood to be nonreligious, but was simply
a different aspect of the sovereign authority of God. 15

The state and church were intertwined during this period,
and there was no doubt that the secular and the religious worked
together. Secular did not mean non-religious.
To ensure that religious diversity would not be a stumbling
block for the members of society in their associations with each
other, the American colonists incorporated the Bill of Rights. With
the First Amendment, '"Secular' gradually came to be associated
with 'religiously neutral."' 16 Politicians, among others, employed
overtly sectarian language in their politicking; although, through

14. !d. at 671 n.3, citing Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the
Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 674, 739 (1987); See also several law journal articles that have been written
on the subject of the lack of a definition of religion and suggesting possible definitions
to the Supreme Court. Anand Agneshwar, Note, Rediscovering God in the
Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 593 (1992); Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 1 (1991/1992); Richard 0.
Frame, Note, Belief in a Nonmaterial Reality--A Proposed First Amendment Definition
of Religion, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 819. As anecdotal evidence, many articles have been
written about the influence of secularism as a religion in public schools, but none have
been cited in any way by the Supreme Court in dealing with these issues when they
arise. A few examples are: Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education:
The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 603 (July 1987); Peter D. Schmid, Comment,
Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 357 (Winter
1989); Craig A. Mason, Comment, 'Secular Humanism' and the Definition of Religion:
Extending a Modified 'Ultimate Concern' Test to Mozert v. Hawkins County Public
Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 445 (April
1988); Michael R. O'Neill, Comment, Government's Denigration of Religion: Is God the
Victim of Discrimination in Our Public Schools?, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 477 (1994); George
W. Dent, Jr., Religious, Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863 (May 1988).
15. Gedicks, supra note 10, at 116-117.
16. Id. at 120.
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the 1800's, general religious language became more acceptable and
even encouraged. However, the divergence of the religious and
secular was furthered and religious language gradually
disappeared from the area of public discourse by the 1930s. 17
"Sectarian discourse became increasingly confined to
private life, and ultimately survived in public life only as 'civil
religion' - faintly Protestant platitudes which reaffirmed the
religious base of American culture despite being largely void of
theological significance."18 In the 20th century, the full separation
between the secular and the religious was completed. Some
considered "civil religion" a violation of the First Amendment;
consequently, the sectarian and secular were severed.
Secularism favors science and the scientific method for
gaining knowledge; its way of knowing is empirical. If a thing
cannot be proven by the scientific method, it is not knowable. This
perspective eliminates the possibility of the Creation or absolute
moral values since there is no way to prove what "good" is. In fact,
science secularized the personal questions of life. The question:
"What is my purpose?" became "How does nature work?" The
question: "Why am I here?'' became "How can we control it?" The
question: "What should I know?" became "How does the mind
work?" The question: "Why should I know this?" became "How can
we control behavior?" The question: "What should I do?" became
"What do people do?" Finally, the question: "Why should we do
this?" became "How can we control society?" 19
Secular questions are variations of traditionally religious
questions, merely asked from a different viewpoint, asserting a
certain way of knowing and relating to the world.
Secularists, including Secular Humanists, have defined
their ideals in three documents. These ideals are summarized in
three documents, the "Humanist Manifesto 1," the "Humanist
Manifesto II," and "A Secular Humanist Declaration." 20 These
documents outline a secularist creed which defines their antitheistic beliefs as religion, ethics as relativistic and based on man,

17. ld. at 120-121.
18. Id. at 122.
19. A. LeGrand Richards, The Secularization of the Academic World-View: The
History of a Process and its Consequences for the Study of Education 313
(1982)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brigham Young University) The religious
questions of "what is" and "why should" were replaced with the secular questions of
"how does" and "how can." Natural science became the secular substitute of
metaphysics. Psychology became the secular substitute of epistemology. Sociology,
anthropology, and political science became the secular substitute of ethics.
20. B. Douglas Hayes, Note, Secular Humanism in Public Schools: Thou Shalt
Have No Other God (Except Thyself), 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 358, 365 (1988).
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the individual as paramount, democratic society with civil liberties
as supreme, and a world community based upon transnational
government. 21
V.

SUPREME COURT DEFINITION OF RELIGION INCLUDES
SECULARISM

An examination of the concepts "secular," "secularism," and
"Secular Humanism" in light of the Supreme Court's definition of
"religion" reveals that these concepts are religious and define a
religion.
Rather than accept the Court's interpretation of its own
decisions, it proves enlightening to look at the practical results of
Supreme Court decisions in this area. The following analyzes,
compares, and examines (1) various Supreme Court interpretations
ofthe term "religion" as found in the public education context, (2)
the Supreme Court definition to the general definitions of religion
explored above in part II and, (3) the implications of that
comparison against the Court's constitutional tests. This analysis
defines "religion" as derived from the actual, practical effect that
each decision has had.
Real changes in the definition of religion in education cases
are exemplified in such cases as Everson u. Board of Education 22 • 23
Here, the Court says that the "establishment of religion" means at
least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence
a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.

21. !d. at 365-366 (quoting the "Humanist Manifesto II"):
1. Religion: Religions which place God above humans do a
disservice. "We find insufficient evidence for belief in the existence
of a supernatural: it is either meaningless or irrelevant to the
question of the survival and fulfillment of the human race. As
nontheists, we begin with humans not God, nature not deity."
Teachings of eternal salvation or damnation are "illusory and
harmful" because they "distract humans from present concerns."
22. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing TP., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Toscano, supra note 1, at 66.
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Neither a state nor the Federal Govemment can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between Church and State."24

However, the terms "participation in the affairs of any religious
organization," "support" of religious activities, and "wall of
separation" were not defined by the Court.
Everson held Maryland residents were not required to take
an oath affirming a belief in God in order to become a public
official.
In Engle u. Vitale, 25 the Supreme Court declared a
mandatory nondenominational prayer for New York public school
students unconstitutional and a violation of the First Amendment.
The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our
teachers, and our Country."26 The Court was correct in ruling that
the prayer forced public school students to exercise religion, but
stretched in suggesting that such a prayer established religion.
The Court's ruling implied that the definition of religion is broader
than an "institutionally established church or sect," and is at least
as broad as "common belief." The impetus behind the prayer most
likely was a group of legislators in New York who shared a
significantly common belief to have passed the prayer into a
prescriptive, mandatory law. The Court implies that those
legislators who voted to have the prayer organized established a
religion.
In Abington u. Schemp, 27 the Court prohibited all Bible
reading in public school, even though the reading was done without
interpretation or comment. Here, content was judged to be
inherently religious. The Court most likely reasoned that many
ideas were put forth by the Bible, and innumerable religions based
on its contents. However, banning Bible reading for its content,
without interpretation, defined religion beyond the institutional
church, beyond a profession of deity, and indicates that the Court
defines religion as the expression of any idea or world view.
In general, literature embraces ideas and world views,
including philosophy, history, social studies, or anthropology.
Teaching goes beyond the survey of these areas. By this definition,

24.
25.
26.
27.

Everson, at 15-16.
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962).
Toscano, supra note 1, at 86, citing Engle v. Vitale, ld.
Abington v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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literature would be considered religion. Yet, interpretations of
knowledge in these subjects are taught, tested, and graded, which
seems inconsistent with traditional concepts of religion.
Epperson v. Arkansas 28 dealt with an Arkansas law that
attempted to ban teaching evolution yet, endorsed teaching
Creation. The Court banned teaching the Creation and eliminated
the prohibition on teaching evolution. The Court offended the
First Amendment by accepting one world view as the only valid
one in the marketplace of ideas, that the biblical creation world
view was inferior, and that evolution was the preferred world view
or interpretation of the origins ofman. 29
Lemon v. Kurtzman 30 arose when Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes allocated public monies to non-public
schools to help provide materials. The court held that the statutes
gave rise to excessive entanglement between church and state.
The Court established a three-part test for statutes and school
policies, which the opinion claimed was the result of a survey of the
Court's decisions of the past. The Court held:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive
government entanglement with religion (citations omitted)."31

Criticism of this decision is voluminous; even individual
members of the Supreme Court criticized and "snubbed" the Lemon
test. For example, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, 32 Justice Scalia's dissent notes that,
"Finally, Justice O'Connor observes [in her dissent] that the
Court's opinion does not focus on the so-called Lemon test, [citation
omitted], and she urges that that test be abandoned, at least as a
"unitary approach" to all Establishment Clause claims." Justice
Scalia further stated he has already "documented the Court's
convenient relationship with Lemon, which it cites only when

28. 393 u.s. 97 (1968).
29. Id.
30. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
31. Id. at 612-613.
32. Bd. ofEduc. ofKiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994)
(5-3 decision) (Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; Blackmun, J., concurring;
Stevens, J., concurring, Blackmun, J. and Ginsburg, J. joining; O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment; Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment;
Scalia, J., dissenting, Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas., J. joining).
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useful.
" He also declared that the Court snubbed Lemon by
acknowledging Lemon with only two "see also" citations, saying,
"The Court's decision today is astounding." 33
It is important to note precisely what the three parts of this
test required. The first prong states there must be "a secular
legislative purpose."34 While this prong is unclear, it indicates a
favoritism for the secular world view.
The second prong lays out a neutrality element, 35 which
states that a statute "must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion."36 The second prong is a direct contradiction to
the first prong, for in the first prong the Court emphasized a need
for "a secular legislative purpose." The secular world view
maintains a privileged position under the guise of "false
neutrality."37
The third prong prohibits "excessive government
entanglement with religion." Here again, the questions of: (1)
what is religion and (2) what constitutes excessive government
entanglement, must be asked. Prior Supreme Court decisions
point to religion as the holding of a world view; the government,
therefore, under it's own third prong of the Lemon test, is already
heavily entangled with public schools, which subscribe to and
promote the secular world view. The implications of excessive
government entanglement remains unclear, but Lemon and later
Court decisions try to set those boundaries.
Lemon determined that excessive federal government
entanglement was the cause behind state governments enactment
of legislation allowing public school funds to subsidize private
school teacher's salaries to the extent that they taught secular
subjects. Most private schools in these states were parochial and
the Court held that "the very restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role
give rise to entanglements between church and state."38 The Court
also made an issue of the fact that this would give rise to people
using religion in politics and voting according to their faith, 39 but

33. Id.
34. Lemon, at 612.
35. See David G. Leitch, Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in
Education, 71 Va. L. Rev. 127 (Feb. 1985).
36. Lemon, at 612.
37. Toscano, supra note 1, at 15-17, 76-83 (discussing the illusion of neutral
education and ideological neutrality and the commitment of the Court to a false
neutrality).
38. Lemon at 620-621.
39. Id. at 622.
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this point is arguably without merit. 40
There is nothing
unconstitutional or improper with individuals holding personal
world views and acting and influencing society according to those
personal world views, such as in voting.
Another problem presented by this third prong is that the
Court itself is guilty of "excessive government entanglement with
religion. "41
Where the national government was originally committed to
keeping its hands off institutional and personal religion, it is now
committed, by the United States Supreme Court, to a policy of
continual interference in the form of case-by-case line drawing, as
the courts attempt to determine which activities of government
amount to a religious preference and which to religious
interference. Thus, the Supreme Court has turned the historical
non-interventionist stance into a continuing intervention stance
by giving to the religion clauses an interpretation that is
repugnant to the intent of those who originally framed the
amendment's language to protect all religions from government
intrusion. 42
Other cases deal with line-drawing of what "excessive
governmental entanglement" is or is not. 43
The Court extends the secular-purpose prong in Stone v.
Graham, 44 ruling that the Ten Commandments could not be posted
in a public school, even though the secular purpose was to promote
the commonly held civic values that the Ten Commandments
contain. 45 The Court imposed a presumption of sectarian intent
where none should have been imposed, striking out against the
possibility of promoting the Judea-Christian world view by
happenstance.
The Supreme Court vaguely referred to its previous
conception of religion. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 46 the Court discussed
"religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those

40. See Stephen L. Carter, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (Bantam 1993).
41. Lemon, at 622.
42. Id.
43. See Toscano, supra note 1, at 93-94 for discussion of the following cases.
Aguilar v. Fenton, 473 US. 402 (1985) (Court invalidates program using federal funds
to pay public employees to give remedial instruction and guidance to non-public
students on premises of church owned schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988) (funding given to religious approaches of solving teenage pregnancy problem).
44. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
45. Toscano, supra note 1, at 91.
46. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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religions founded on different beliefs."47 The Court then listed
some belief systems in the United States "which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God [such
as] Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others (citations omitted)."48 This dictum indicates the Court's
definition of religion encompasses at least as far as "religion as
philosophy" because some of the above "isms," such as Secular
Humanism, are considered by many to be philosophies, not
religion.
An interesting turn in First Amendment jurisprudence is
found in Lynch v. Donnelly. 49 Here the court adopted religious
"accommodation" by finding constitutional a publicly purchased
and displayed creche, and by retreating from the "wall of
separation" doctrine. 50
From these various decisions and their effects, one gleans
the meanings given to religion by the U.S. Supreme Court. In
Abington v. Schemp, we learned that the reading of a text which
espoused a world view, in this case the Bible, even without
interpretation, was a violation of the First Amendment. Torcaso
indicated that a religion need not be theistic in order to be a
religion. This is important in the analysis, for then the other
Supreme Court religion tests can be applied no matter the basis of
a given world view. The reasoning in Engle is evidence that the
Court could consider that a non-denominational, theistic prayer
established a religion. It is easy to see how such a fixed, short
prayer could be seen as a catechism, which is how the recitation of
facts or answers to a test could be seen. Stone showed disfavor for
a certain way of expressing commonly held values, while the
Epperson ruling suggested a preference for science law.
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION HAs ADOPTED SECULARISM AS ITS
FOUNDATION

Public education has adopted secularism, specifically
Secular Humanism, as its underlying foundation. Professor A.
LeGrand Richards 51 points out that an important aspect of proving
the secular trend in education resulted from American schools of
educational philosophy trading in their ideological/philosophical

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 495.
Id. at 495 n.ll.
465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Toscano, supra note 1, at 92.
Professor in the College of Education, Brigham Young University.
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roots for roots in science. 52 By the 1930s, the transition from the
education/philosophical approach to education to the
scientific/instructional science approach to education was
complete. 53 No longer did the American educational establishment
search the American soul and ask the crucial questions of what
should be taught in American schools. Rather, it turned from
those questions and focused "philosophy of education" on how to
teach whatever is taught more efficiently and with better results.
The focus turned to methods instead to basic questions of why.
"What" became the methods of "how"; striving for better
methodology and scientific advancement became the "why."
Any coherent approach to education must answer either
explicitly, or by implication, at least three fundamental questions:
What is man? What should he be? and How should we help him
become what he should be? 54

Richards goes on to suggest that a Christian concept of man is an
appropriate world view for the educational environment, 55 and as
such need not be excluded from the discussion of educational
theory and practice. If this approach is correct, then any answers
must be religious, for an answer to the question "Who is man?"
must necessarily dictate an ideology or an approach to knowing the
world. This example shows that, though the world view promoted
would change from secularism to Christianity, there must be some
world view foundation for education. If a world view is religion,
and schools must promote a world view in order to teach, and
schools are sponsored by government, then schools are teaching
religion, which is unconstitutional under the tests the Supreme
Court has promulgated.
Because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
"establishment" as ideological rather than institutional, 56 the Court
has constitutionally pushed government outside the schooling
business without explicitly admitting it. By evaluating these cases
in this way, the Court has shown that government should leave the
schooling business or be guilty of establishing a state

52. Interview with A. LeGrand Richards, Assistant Professor of Education at
Brigham Young University (Jan. 12, 1995).
53. Id.
54. Richards, supra note 197, at 300; see also A. LeGrand Richards, Technology,
Democracy and the American Dream in Education, Rassegna Di Pedagogia (1992); A.
LeGrand Richards, Padagogik vs. Pedagogy: The Technological Seduction of American
Educational Theory, Proceedings of Far West. Phil. ofEduc. Soc'y. (1989).
55. ld.
56. Toscano, supra note 1, at 64.
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ideology/religion.

VII.

DUE TO THE INHERENT PROMOTION OF AN IDEOLOGY IN

EDUCATION AND VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE THAT GOVERNMENT WITHDRAW
ITSELF FROM CURRICULUM DECISIONS IN PARTICULAR AND
ENTANGLING INVOLVEMENT IN GENERAL

Under Supreme Court rulings, the government should
exclude itselffrom dictating the interpretations and values taught
in school. If not even a "civil religion" is allowed as permissible
religion, then the teaching process itself falls outside the oversight
of the government because the teaching process involves values
and world views on how, what, and why students should be
taught. 57
Compulsory education requirements are evidence of the
57. Many questions arise in the ideological context. Toscano asks the following
series of questions:
Should strongly held beliefs, especially with regard to education and
curriculum, go unexpressed simply because the majority feels that such
beliefs are religious? If so, how can religious ideas be avoided in American
education? And, if they are avoided, what kind of public education will
result? Should the historical Reformation be taught solely as a political,
social, and economic movement without any mention of its religious basis or
theological origin? And, if the theological questions are raised at all, how
should they be treated? As meaningless? Irrelevant? Or superstitious?
Can a religious question ever be treated in the public schools as a serious
question upon which reasonable individuals could differ? Can racial equality
be taught without invoking a moral value and without explaining its religious
source? Can any religion or ideology survive after two generations of school
children have effectively been insulated from it? Is there any hope for a
society dedicated to peace and to justice if its religious underpinnings are
removed from future generations?
"How far away from the Judea-Christian tradition must America move to
make sure that it is not establishing as religion or effectuating as public
policy a viewpoint that is ultimately traceable to the Judea-Christian
tradition?" [citation omitted]. How many issues must be removed from the
democratic arena because they are religiously motivated? Should, for
example, our senators and representatives disqualify themselves from voting
in the halls of our legislatures simply because their views are born of
religious, as opposed to secular, convictions? Is the state prohibited from
imparting or from allowing churches or parents to impart to a child in public
school anything "that might influence his ultimate concerns and paramount
beliefs?" [citation omitted]. How can any subject matter be religiously neutral
when it is offensive to a person's religious convictions?
Toscano, supra note 1, at 82.
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government's interest in an educated populace. In light of this
interest, the Supreme Court has three alternatives to dealing with
religion in American schools. The first option is to maintain the
views previously expressed, becoming more entangled in
curriculum content, thereby defining the state ideology.
Another option the Supreme Court may follow is to back off
its stance toward religion and allow states broader latitude to
enact statutes similar to those previously adjudged
unconstitutional by the Court. This option is repugnant to many
and would require even more litigation to re-define where the
limits of values and ideology cross too far into the establishment
of religion in public schools.
The third option is for the Supreme Court to remove itself
entirely from involving the Court and government in educational
issues that deal with values and ideology. This non-interference
stance would perhaps require government to relinquish its direct
sponsorship of education to a light regulatory, but non-curricular
role over schools.
Whatever the case may be, the Court has found itself, as a
government entity, entangled with religion by adjudicating too
many cases involving religion. These problems indicate that the
Court should step back and recognize, as it did in creating the Erie
Doctrine, that it has extended itself into an area, inappropriate for
Supreme Court venturing. In education, it is inappropriate for the
Court and government to dictate an ideology since the Court itself
has for practical purposes defined an ideology as religion.
In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 the Supreme Court overruled
the common practice in the federal district courts of disregarding
state law to decide state cases and creating and applying a "federal
common law." This practice was based on the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson. 59 The Erie decision held: "There is no federal general
common law."60 The Court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes who
described the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson as "an unconstitutional
assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us
hesitate to correct."61
Just as the Court acknowledged that the federal courts'
application of federal general common law was erroneous, they
should now acknowledge that their own "unconstitutional

58.
59.
60.
61.

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
Erie, at 78.
Erie, at 79 (quoting Swift v. Tyson).
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assumption of powers" and entanglement of First Amendment
jurisprudence is likewise erroneous.
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STILL
ALLOW A "FREE, PuBLIC EDUCATION" ARE VOUCHERS, TAX
CREDITS, OR EQUAL TIME STATUTES THAT THE SUPREME COURT
WILL LIKELY NOT STRIKE DOWN

Two possible solutions to this dilemma of excessive
government entanglement with religion are (1) promote greater
privatization of schools through tax credits, vouchers or state
charter schools, or (2) avoid striking down equal time statutes
contained in many local school board statutes. The problems that
must be overcome involve the fact that many state constitutions
require a compulsory education that be both "free" and "public."
Both Carter and Toscano suggest that vouchers or tax
credits are constitutional approaches that would allow citizens to
choose a school that coincides with their "religion."62 Simply
speaking, vouchers and tax credits both allow parents to allocate
money collected for educational purposes to any school of the
parents' choice, whether private or public. By allowing parents to
send their children to their school of choice, the Court and the
government avoid promoting any "religion." Thus meeting the
requirements of a "free" and "public" education, while keeping
religious influence to a minimum.
State charter schools are schools where groups of citizens
can organize their own school with state monies, make their own
decisions as to hiring of teachers and curriculum, and receive
funding according to how many children attend the school.
There is a legitimate concern that either system of tax
credits/vouchers or charter schools may still entangle the Court far
too extensively by allowing tax money collected by the government
to go toward private religious schools. One way to deal with this
problem is that the government could cut back its involvement in
the educational establishment to the extent that it is not
considered the supporter of any particular school.
This could be done in the same manner that Congress has
chartered federal mortgage companies. The Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) is a federally-sponsored private
corporation which is not considered to be a direct government
entity. In court cases where the FNMA has been challenged for
violation of insufficient notice, the courts have held that for

62. Carter, supra note 40, at 192-194, 200; Toscano, supra note 1, at 126.
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constitutional purposes these federally chartered mortgage
companies' actions are not sufficient state action to be bound by
the Due Process, notice, and hearing provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 63
School districts could be chartered by state governments
while still avoiding government regulation held to the strict
standards of the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. This
would require a quasi- or full privatization of public education,
sufficient to allow local school districts to follow the wishes of their
patrons. This may seem to be a legal fiction, but it is no more a
legal fiction than the supposed ideological neutrality in public
schools' curriculum today.
Many voice concerns about the effect of privatization on the
quality of education. One possible way to address this concern is
to insure that general knowledge is being taught to meet the
educational requirements of the state, perhaps through
standardized tests, such as are already in place, and could be the
criteria by which schools are granted certification by the state.
Some might argue the solution is to allow equal time to all
views of the world. 64 This would be an unacceptable and
impossible task because there would be no realistic way to
incorporate all world views - at least one would be objectionable to
some school patron. This option also assumes that all world views
are known and thus could be taught. Not insignificantly, this
approach would also lead to more court intervention and
entanglement.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The definitions of religion used by the Court today are
easily broad enough to include all notions of values and world
views. The definition of secular today means that world view
which accepts only "objective" and "empirical" ways of knowing the
world and eschews religion. Applying these definitions to the

63. GrantS. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw,§ 7.27, n.2
(1993)(Footnote 2 gives a large list of cases supporting this result under the
Fourteenth Amendment); § 7.28 (Explains no sufficient state action for Fifth
Amendment purposes where the government acts contractually)(See Warren v. Gov't
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. den. 449 U.S. 847 (1980)(GNMA
not considered the federal government for Fifth Amendment purposes because,
according to Nelson and Whitman, "the court was suggesting that even the United
States can act in a proprietary or commercial, as opposed to governmental, fashion .
. ." The suggestion here is that government involvement in public education be
considered proprietary and not governmental action).
64. See Toscano, supra note 1, at 124.
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practical effects of Supreme Court decisions shows that no
ideology, not even secularism, may be promoted by government,
and not even in the public schools. Since no true education can
occur without a view of the world by which to transmit or teach
values or interpretations of knowledge, all teaching must
inherently be religious. Secularism as a world view has been
adopted by the educational establishment and the Supreme Court.
Thus, the Court by its definition of religion has put educational
curriculum outside the Court's and government's constitutional
control by declaring that any delivery of religious teaching with
public monies is unconstitutional. 65
Paul Waldron

65. See Everson, at 15. ("No tax in any amount ... can be levied to support any
religious activities ... whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.")

